TorahMiTzion
Feature
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In the face of ongoing Palestinian terrorism against Israeli citizens, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, in an address to the Fourth Herziliya Conference on December 18, 2003, proposed the "Disengagement Plan." Since that time, the Plan has been at the forefront of public debate in Israel, stirring strong emotions both for and against its mandate.
This article will give a brief background and outline of the Plan, and then review the two sides of the national debate: the "pro-disengagement" arguments and the "anti-disengagement" arguments.
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Background |
Ariel Sharon was long seen by many as a right-wing hawk, having earned the nickname "the father of the settlement enterprise" by virtue of being viewed as the architect and primary political backer of the building of Jewish communities on land captured by the IDF in the 1967 wars.
As Prime Minister of Israel, Ariel Sharon had, like so many Israeli leaders before him, promised to bring security and peace to Israel. These claims were particularly pressing in light of the renewed violence that had begun in the Fall of 2000. In March 2003, the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority committed themselves to the "Roadmap to Peace" (See Appendix C) that had been introduced by President George Bush in June 2002. This act received a warm welcome from the international community: "Seven months ago, my government approved the 'Roadmap' to peace…We are willing to proceed toward its implementation: two states, Israel and a Palestinian state, living side by side in tranquility, security and peace" (Sharon, 18 December 2003. See Appendix C).
Continued Palestinian violence during the interim period, however, led to a landmark speech by Sharon in which he declared that if the Palestinians did not stop the violence and return to the peaceful paths of the Roadmap within the coming months, then his government would initiate unilateral steps that would be based on the premise that Israel no longer had a partner for peace: "However, if in a few months the Palestinians still continue to disregard their part in implementing the Roadmap, then Israel will initiate the unilateral security steps of disengagement from the Palestinians" (Sharon, 18 December 2003). Sharon was quick to stress that this proclamation did not supersede the Roadmap, that indeed he was still committed to the Roadmap. "The purpose of the Disengagement Plan is to reduce terror as much as possible, and grant Israeli citizens the maximum level of security" (Sharon, 18 December 2003). Sharon emphasized that the Plan was a security measure and not a political one. He received support for these moves from President Bush in an exchange of letters after Sharon’s declaration of intention (See Appendix C). Notably, Bush’s letter marked the first time an American president has stated that no final peace agreement could require Israel to return to the pre-1967 borders: "As part of a final peace settlement, Israel must have secure and recognized borders, which should emerge from negotiations between the parties in accordance with UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338. In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli populations centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949, and all previous efforts to negotiate a two-state solution have reached the same conclusion. It is realistic to expect that any final status agreement will only be achieved on the basis of mutually agreed changes that reflect these realities."
While the majority of Sharon’s Likud party voted against the Plan in a referendum held after his announcement, Sharon disavowed the referendum’s results and has continued to declare the Plan a fait accomplit. He has also rejected calls for a national referendum on the subject. But the political leadership’s seemingly inexorable progress towards disengagement is playing itself out against the background of fierce debate in both the political and civilian arena. Both the "pro" and "con" sides claim to represent the "majority" of Israeli society, branding the other as attempting to impose the will of the minority on the entire nation. The "pro" group highlights the results of most national polls, which indicate that the majority of the population favors disengagement, including results publicized on an Israeli television program on January 16-17, 2005, which found that 64% of Israelis would vote for a unilateral disengagement if a national referendum were held. (Polls show that a majority of Israelis favor a general referendum on the Plan, even though most of those said they would vote in favor of the disengagement.) The "con" group points to the defeat of the Plan in the Likud referendum and to the large turnouts at demonstrations staged in opposition to the Plan. Most recently, on January 30-31, 2005, a 24-hour rally held near the Knesset was estimated to have drawn 150,000 anti-disengagement protesters. (A protest in favor of disengagement is scheduled for February 2005). New Knesset legislation allocates monetary compensation for the residents of Gush Katif and other settlements to be evacuated, though the precise amount remains under discussion (See Appendix C).
Conflicts related to the disengagement issue abound. There is internal conflict within the anti-disengagement camp, between those who recommend maintaining a dialogue with the government regarding future compensation and re-location (so that should the necessity arise the best terms will have been negotiated) and those who feel that even alluding to the possibility implies an admission of defeat. There is also internal debate in this camp regarding the issue of "refusal" - whether soldiers should refuse direct military orders to evacuate settlements (see Appendix C). Many in the nation, including those on both sides of the disengagement issue, have also called for a national referendum to put the decision in the hands of the people. Sharon has so far opposed this call. Some fear that no matter what the outcome, the conflict will have affected forever the internal dynamics of Israeli society, causing irreconcilable divisions among its various sectors.
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Outline of the major points of the Disengagement Plan: |
Gaza Strip:
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Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip, including all existing Israeli settlements
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Israel will maintain a military presence in "The Philadelphia Corridor" between Egypt and the Gaza Strip
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Israel will retain control of the airspace of the Gaza Strip, and the Gaza sea port of Dhanieh will remain closed
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The Gaza Strip will become a demilitarized zone, except for weapons allowed for in existing agreements
West Bank - Judea and Samaria:
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Israel will evacuate the four settlements of Ganim, Kadim, Homesh and Sanur in Northern Samaria
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Consequently, territorial contiguity in Northern Samaria will be achieved
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All permanent military instillations in this area will be dismantled
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The construction of the security fence will continue
General
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Existing arrangements regarding international agreements will remain in place
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There will be no foreign presence in the Gaza Strip or West Bank
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Israel will retain the right to self-defense, including the right to take pre-emptive steps against threats from the Gaza Strip and evacuated segments of Northern Samaria
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Pro-Disengagement |
Ariel Sharon’s adoption of the Disengagement Plan left many citizens of Israel reeling. Those in the deepest state of shock were perhaps his arch-rivals on the left-wing end of the Israeli political spectrum. Many members of this group had demonized Sharon ever since he adopted the "Greater Israel" outlook following the 1967 war, denouncing him for having led Israel into the 1982 "Operation Peace for the Galilee" Lebanon War as defense minister, and for having, as housing minister, authorized the building of many settlements and hundreds of homes over the Green Line.
These, along with many Israelis who would describe themselves as politically "middle-of-the-road," suddenly saw in Sharon the Prime Minister that would enable Israel to leave the Gaza Strip. No longer would they - or their sons - be sent to perform military service in the Strip, protecting some 8,000 Jewish residents outnumbered by more than 1.3 million Palestinians. Many self-declared moderates embraced the evacuation of Gaza as a compromise position - as a region in which Jews represent only a minute fraction of the total population, in an area which they do not consider a part of the Biblical "Land of Israel," it represents the "least painful" form of territorial sacrifice. Several recent acts of terrorism in the area have only strengthened the belief that, at least in Gaza, the benefits of evacuation far outweigh the disadvantages.
Many on the left see the Disengagement Plan as a great precedent-setter in two ways: Firstly, if Jewish settlements are evacuated now, then in the future no one will be able to claim that it cannot be done. In fact, many are likening the evacuation of Jewish residents in the Gaza Strip to the evacuation of Jewish settlements in the Northern Negev as a result of the peace treaty with Egypt that was signed into agreement by right-wing Prime Minister Menachem Begin. These supporters of the Plan cite Egypt as a precedent for their view that land must be given up for the sake of peace. Secondly, if an Israeli government comprising the largest ever number (40 seats) of members of the right-wing Likud party is prepared to evacuate Jewish settlements and give over land to the Palestinians, then, were a left-wing government to come to power and behave similarly, they could no longer be accused of "selling out" the Land by their actions.
Also cited are the diplomatic benefits and the consequent economic benefits that supporters believe would result from actualizing the Disengagement. Israel’s reputation, they say, would be enhanced amongst the international community as the country is praised for making efforts towards peace and the eventual establishment of a Palestinian state. AIPAC, the largest American political action committee on behalf of Israel stated that "international support for Israel has increased following the disengagement decision, while enormous pressure has been exerted on the Palestinians" (AIPAC - Near East Report, 28 June 2004).
Indeed, in the years following the signing of the Oslo Accords and subsequent agreements, the Israeli economy flourished. Many viewed this as a direct result of Israel’s enhanced international standing. The post-Oslo era saw the cessation of much of the long running Arab-led economic boycott of Israel. Pro-disengagement proponents predict that Israel will once again receive new commercial and diplomatic contacts and initiatives in response to their being a trailblazer in the attempt to bring peace to this region.
Those opposed to settlements have long cited the "huge amounts" of money that are allocated to the construction and defense of legal - and even illegal - settlements, as evidence of the flawed priorities of the Israeli government. In fact, a report released in January 2005 indicated that the government had spent millions of shekels on illegal settlements throughout the West Bank and Gaza. From this perspective, the pull-out from Gaza will yield direct and immediate economic benefits, stemming from the savings expected to result from the decrease in financing for housing, as well as reserve soldiers’ wages, special protective equipment for residential and communal facilities, and rehabilitation for injured victims of Palestinian violence, in Gaza. The pro-disengagement camp eagerly awaits the day when these financial resources can be redirected to other national priorities such as health care and education.
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Anti-Disengagement |
"The Sharon speech amounts to a major blunder; were its defeatist policies put into effect they would spur Palestinians to engage in more violence and so delay a resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict" (Daniel Pipes, 8 January 2004).
Many of the Jewish residents of the Gaza Strip and Northern Samaria feel abandoned by the Israeli government. After all, they claim, it was the Israeli government (even under left-wing governments in the 1970s) that encouraged them to settle in these areas by offering attractive incentives. For years they were told that they were critical to the defense of the State, that their presence in Gush Katif and the other Jewish communities of Gaza acted as a bulwark that prevented the incursion of enemy troops and rockets. For some residents, who had previously been uprooted from the Negev communities (such as the Yamit community in the Sinai), the Disengagement Plan is no less than a recurring nightmare. Mincing no words, some go so far as to claim that by making certain parts of Israel "off limits" to Jews, the Israeli government is undertaking a program of ethnic-cleansing amongst is own people - essentially making the Gaza Strip "Junderein."
Many of the anti-disengagement proponents feel defrauded by Prime Minister Sharon and his Likud government. Uzi Landau, one of the 13 so-called Likud "rebels" in the Knesset who oppose the disengagement, pointed out that in the last election, it was Sharon’s political opponent Amram Mitzna of Labor who advocated a unilateral withdrawal from Gaza. Landau believes that many of those who voted for Sharon and Likud did so in opposition to Mitzna’s plan. "This was the focal point of the entire election," Landau said. "Now the prime minister is … promoting a policy [the people] voted against." According to this view, Likud won its biggest parliamentary representation in its history, and then "changed course, " betraying its own voters.
Another argument voiced is that rather than being a show of strength, the Disengagement is actually a demonstration of weakness. The claim is that the Palestinians are in fact being rewarded for four years of terrorism and violence, by having the Israeli army leave, accompanied, by force if necessary, by the Jewish residents of this area. Many fear that this will just encourage further violence, as the Palestinians try to "gain" more territory: "They [the Palestinians] don’t see it as a favor from Sharon’s government, they see it as an outcome of their struggle," in the words of Ziad Abu Amr, a Palestinian academic.
The military argument is further boosted by opponents of disengagement who claim that the pull-out from territory will not satisfy the Palestinians, and thus lead to a cessation of terrorism, but to the contrary, will ease their way to further violence. If the Israeli army has trouble suppressing attacks while still able to mobilize within the Gaza Strip, they say, what will happen when the Israeli army can no longer enter this territory in pursuit of these attackers? How will they capture the Kassam rockets and the people who fire them?
Many also cite religious arguments as support for their views. They claim that all Israeli territory is part of the biblical Israel G-d gave to the Jewish people, as can be witnessed by the "miraculous" military victories over the past 57 years, and that no human being has the right to relinquish any of the Land. (Rabbis across the religious spectrum remain divided on this question. See Appendix A)
Perhaps the hardest part of the Plan for many to accept is the fact that it involves no reciprocity or conditionality whatsoever (Note: On February 8, 2005, Sharon met with Arafat’s successor, Mahmoud Abbas, at a meeting in Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt. The two leaders declared a cease-fire and each announced steps their side would take towards decreasing violence. What effect this development will have on the planned "unilateral" disengagement from Gaza remains to be seen). The Israeli government is demanding nothing in return for this action. No previously signed agreements will be required to be upheld in order for this Plan to be implemented. It is also an all-or-nothing plan, rather than a phased evacuation that depends on certain conditions being fulfilled by the other side.
Finally, there is the complaint that the Disengagement Plan is not a genuine "disengagement," as Palestinians will, with certain restrictions, still be allowed to enter Israel as day laborers. The Palestinian inhabitants of Gaza will still rely to an extent on Israel for their electricity supply and certain other essential services. Opponents of disengagement question how such a situation can accurately be termed a true "disengagement" of the two populations.
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Conclusion |
Passions continue to run high on both sides of the debate. Members of the military, the entire political spectrum, the rabbinate, and the media have contributed their views, while groups both for and against the Disengagement continue to stage mass protests and rallies, each attempting to demonstrate the extent of support for their views. The final outcome - and its effect on Israel, both internally, and in its relations with its Arab neighbors and the international community at large - remains to be seen.
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Appendix A: Selected Rabbis on Record regarding the Disengagement |
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Questions were addressed to Labor-Meimad MK R’ Michael Melchior, who backs the Disengagement Plan, in a public forum. In response to the question as to how he, as a religious man "can support the uprooting of Jews from Gaza when all major halakhic authorities have ruled against it," he wrote, "I seriously believe that the State of Israel needs borders… and even though we might be connected to part of Gaza or southern Lebanon and for sure connected to Judea and Samaria, when we weigh the pros and cons my pro comes up as a wish to disengage, create a border which will give Israel a possibility to be both a Jewish and a democratic state. For those who have asked how this fits into the halakhic terminology, first I would like to quote R’ Soloveitchik who… after the Six-Day War very clearly stated that anybody who goes to rabbis to ask on the question of giving up land, is doing what he called ‘a ridiculous thing.’ This question has to be decided according to the overall concerns - saving life, the economy, society, the well-being and security of the Jewish state, and I have no doubt that 7,000 settlers in Gaza amongst a population of nearly 1.5 million Palestinians… has no future, no perspective, no hope in it. And therefore painfully - painfully because of our care for the people who live there - we have to return them home into the State of Israel."
He also wrote that the religious right in Israel is "willing to sacrifice the democracy on the altar of the ‘greater Israel’ and unfortunately, the pseudo-messianic movement which has developed since the Six Day War and has strongly infiltrated the… Israel national religious community… this has led to the crisis which now is threatening in many ways our internal existence."
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Rav Ovadiah Yosef, spiritual leader of the Sephardic community in Israel and de facto authority of the Shas political party, has in the past ruled that it might be necessary to withdraw from lands of Israel conquered in 1967, if the army commanders deem it necessary. In his latest ruling, he stated that after hearing from several military experts and various explanations of the Disengagement Plan, he chose to reject the Plan on the grounds that it did not maintain the safety of Israel’s citizens (but notably he made no reference to any issue of "Greater Israel"). On the other hand, he stressed that when a Palestinian partner emerges, he will support a peace agreement.
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R’ Yoel Bin Nun, head of the religious kibbutz movement yeshiva near Ein Tzurim, considered a moderate of the settlement movement, stated in an interview: "The disengagement plan is a scandal. It is insane. The absolutely certain result will be the burial of the prospect for peace. From the point of view of anyone who wants peace and believes in peace, this plan is suicide."
He explained this view in terms of both security and human rights terms: "Since the Six-Day War, the correct policy of every Israeli government was that there will be no withdrawal without recognition, without negotiations and without a peace agreement... That response worked. It obliged the neighboring Arab states and the Palestinians gradually to compromise with Israel; to reach agreements with us in order to get territories from us. The disengagement plan breaks that long-term strategy… It will persuade the Palestinian street that every concession to Israel is stupidity, idiocy and folly. Thus, it will thwart every chance of reaching peace in this generation. As Oslo shattered the dream of Greater Israel, the disengagement will shatter the dream of peace. That is its true meaning…
"What shocks me is that after 120 years of Zionism, it turns out that the Jews are still different from other people. Jews are people who can simply be moved from one place to another. And in their own country, too, and by their own government… [Imagine] if Israel were to decide to expel 8,000 Arab citizens from one place to another within its sovereign territory. Think for a moment what would happen if 8,000 Arabs were removed from their homes. What the court would say. What the media would say. The demonstrations that would be held in Rabin Square. It is entirely clear that it would not be allowed to happen. It would be regarded as a brutal act that would be unacceptable… [However] there is one sector in Israel to which human rights do not apply - the settlers. And now that truth has been exposed in the light of day. Now it becomes clear that all the human rights rhetoric was a bluff. One big lie. A total lie. Because if human rights exist, they are indivisible. Therefore I, for example, am against the expulsion of people from their homes by force in any case, be they Jews or Arabs. But I belong to a negligible minority. The great majority in the country supports the expulsion of Jews or Arabs, all subject to their political agenda. So this whole world of the Association for Civil Rights and the human rights organizations has now been exposed in its vacuity. It’s all one big bluff. It’s all one giant deception that is meant to serve the political goals of the left."
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In January 2005, the (Haredi) Council of Torah Sages ruled that its political party, United Torah Judaism, could enter Sharon’s coalition in the Knesset (and thus provide the votes necessary to actualize the Disengagement Plan). This action was taken by the authority of the Council’s head, Lithuanian gadol Rav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv; however, it was opposed by several Chassidic Rebbes who are members of the Council. The Rebbe of Erloi, a member of the Council, met with Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom, who requested that he support a bill calling for a referendum. The Rebbe’s response: "If the final result is that Jewish communities must be evacuated, then I won’t agree under any circumstances. I do not agree to give even one grain of sand of the Land of Israel to the Arabs."
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At a joint assembly of rabbis from both the haredi and national-religious sectors, R’ Simcha HaCohen Kook, Chief Rabbi of Rehovot, said that he visited R’ Elyashiv and that he believes that R’ Elyashiv was misled by "wheeler-dealers" who gave him incorrect information. (R’ Kook later stated for the record that he had never said anything negative about R’ Elyashiv.)
The assembly resolved that: "The Prime Minister is causing a terrible civil war, the end of which cannot be foretold…We will not refrain from expressing our protest… at the strengthening of this wicked government by G-d fearing Jews against the clear majority of the leading rabbis of Israel…"
Former Chief Rabbi Mordechai Eliyahu added: "No one in the world has the right to cede the Jewish People’s right to any part of the Land, and such a move must be fought."
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In February 2005, UTJ MK R’ Avraham Ravitz announced that R’ Elyashiv now supported a national refererendum and had declared that the MKs of United Torah Judaism must vote in favor of such a referendum. This was R’ Elyashiv’s first public statement related to the disengagment issue. R’ Elyashiv has not revealed to anyone his view on disengagement per se.
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Rabbi Shabtai Sabato, head of Yeshivat Netivot Yosef in Mitzpeh Yericho, also supports a referundum. He explained why:
"There are three reasons: One is that there is seemingly no other way to stop this terrible decree, and the second is that it is very likely that with a great effort, we can convince most of the public to object to this plan... But the third point is the most important of all, and outshadows the other two. It is based on the fundamental approach that G-d created the world and mankind not so that He can force His will upon us, but rather that we should follow the right path of our own choice. This is a basic tenet of the Torah: it is given to our free choice, and we are not forced... It is G-d’s will that we should decide; He doesn't want robots. We praise Him by choosing the right path, and not by behaving like robots... "
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Both Rav Eliyahu and former Chief Rabbi Avraham Shapira, Rosh Yeshiva of Mercaz Harav, two major rabbinic authorities of the National Religious community, have publicly called upon IDF soldiers to refuse to obey military orders to evacuate settlements or to in any way promote or participate in the disengagement process. R’ Eliyahu expressed his support for those soldiers who choose to "hand over their guns to an officer and join settlers" against disengagement.
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R’ Yehudah Gilad of the Religious Kibbutz Movement declared R’ Eliyahu’s statement to be "terrible and incomprehensible." R’ Gilad, who helped organize a meeting of rabbis and religious army officers who oppose disobeying evacuation orders, added, "I'm not worthy of contradicting Rabbi Eliyahu. I'd like to think that he was misunderstood." R’ Gilad said that rabbis who invalidate disengagement leave no choice for their students but refusal. "When disengagement is described in such monstrous terms the logical conclusion is unbridled opposition, which will inevitably lead to complete anarchy. We are racing toward the abyss - when we reach the brink it will be too late to pullback. It already happened once. We must try to stop before it’s too late."
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R’ Shapira, in an interview with the publication B’Sheva, said, "God-fearing members of the security forces should notify their commanders that just as they would refuse to an order to cease upholding the Sabbath or eat non-Kosher meat, they would refuse to uproot Jews from their homes." R’ Shapira declared that it "is the will of Heaven" for a soldier not only to refuse to uproot a Jewish community, but to also refuse to assist those doing the action.
11. Dozens of rabbis joined R’ Shapira in calling on religious soldiers to refuse orders to evacuate settlers. In a letter published Sunday, the rabbis wrote, "Eretz Israel is a holy land, and thus it is forbidden to hand it over to the goyim (non-Jews). "
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R’ Melchior called on R’ Shapira "as a rabbi who shoulders tremendous responsibility, to retract this terrible religious dictum."
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Former Chief Rabbi Meir Lau came out against Shapira’s statement. "You cannot endanger the entire public. I think that even Rav Shapira knows that you cannot practically place this decision on the shoulders of a 19-year-old soldier, " R’ Lau said on the Knesset Channel. He was quoted as saying that refusing military orders could destroy Israel.
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Yeshiva University Chancellor Norman Lamm, former Chief Rabbi Eliyahu Bakshi-Doron, and Rav Aharon Lichtenstein, Rosh Yeshiva of Yeshivat Har Etzion ("Gush"), signed a statement condemning "recent calls for insubordination" Refusal, they wrote, would "erode morale and discipline, endanger purposive unity, engender internecine strife, and embolden our enemies." The letter does not take a position on the advisability of disengagement.
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In January 2005, a flyer was circulated which sought to publicize a speech about civil war given by R’ Zvi Yehuda HaCohen Kook, considered the spiritual father of the settlement movement. Rabbis who themselves oppose disengagement have nevertheless sought to counteract the claim of some that the speech validates violent responses to policemen or soldiers carrying out disengagement.
R’ Zalman Melamed of Beit El, a fierce opponent of disengagement who has urged soldiers to disobey orders to evacuate settlements, wrote, "One should not take active measures. We will not hurt a soldier or a policeman. But we will not participate in this act, which in our opinion is a sin of the most serious sort."
R’ Shlomo Aviner of Beit El published a strict prohibition against violence during the evacuation: "This army is our army, and this police force is our police force," he wrote. "They are our brothers, even if they are coming to carry out an order that should not have been given… Don’t lift a hand, don’t insult, don’t hate. Even in difficult situations, we will adhere to love for all Israel… We will not even shove a soldier. We will embrace him."
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"Pikuach Nefesh," an organization of rabbis opposed to relinquishing Israeli territory released a statement saying:
"The people" have no moral right to decide to uproot Jews from the land of Israel, given to the Jewish people by G-d. It is Pikuach Nefesh to take the security risk inherent in uprooting Jews from Gush Katif. No "democratic law can uproot a single comma from our holy Torah…" Just as a "democratic majority" cannot repeal brit milah… neither can a "democratic decision" legitimately uproot Jews from their land. Furthermore, if a democracy tries to pass "anti-democratic laws," such as to the decision to uproot citizens from their homes, then that decision, even if arrived at by majority vote, cannot be legal.
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In June 2004, R’ Avigdor Neventzhal, the Rabbi of the Old City of Jerusalem, stated that under the Din Rodef religious law, any Jew who gives away any part of Biblical Israel to non-Jews could be killed. However, he underscored that this law is outdated and never specifically mentioned Ariel Sharon’s name in his comments.
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Appendix B: Timetable for the Disengagement Process |
· July 2004: Army begins preparing for withdrawal from security installations in Gaza.
· August 2004 through July 2005: Voluntary evacuations of Jewish settlers, according to compensation arrangements.
· October 2004: Israeli target for working out understandings with international organizations, like the World Bank, on the transfer of property in Gaza to the Palestinians.
· February 2005: Sharon to bring to his Cabinet the first of four votes on evacuating settlements.
· July 2005: The last of the four Cabinet votes.
· Aug. 14, 2005: Deadline for settlers to voluntarily leave Gaza and the four West Bank enclaves. Only security forces and settlers who have refused to leave remain. Army declares the area a closed military zone.
· Sept. 1, 2005: Army begins forceful evacuations of remaining settlers.
· Sept. 15, 2005: Forceful evacuation of settlers ends.
· Sept. 30, 2005: Army to complete military withdrawal, although it may remain in narrow corridor along Gaza's border with Egypt.
(Jewish Virtual Library)
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Appendix C: For Further Information |
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"The World Factbook"
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/... -
Text of Sharon’s speech at the Herzliya Conference, December 18, 2003.
http://www.israelpr.com/sharonspeech1006.html
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Text of the "Roadmap"
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/...
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The Disengagement Plan: Selected Documents, from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (English)
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/...
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The Disengagement Plan: General Outline, from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (English)
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/...
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Compensation Allocations Scale:
http://216.239.59.104/search?q=cache:wZSAoGuTKusJ:www....
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Joint Press Conference between President Bush and Prime Minister Sharon
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/...
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Text of the exchange of letters between President Bush and Prime Minister Sharon
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/...
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Text of speeches by Sharon and Abbas at their meeting on February 8, 2005.
Sharon’s speech: http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/...
Abbas’s speech: http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/...
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Links relevant to the Disengagement Plan: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/...
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Written by: Yaelle Ehrenpreis Meyer |
Submitted: 22/Feb/2005
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ואו, ממש עבודת מחקר, תודה